Oftentimes in a relationship, people divvy up work like a team: wife will be the bill payer, husband is responsible for the kids’ transportation, etc. Likewise, we often see one party be more of a saver and the other a spender. In many partnerships, this works, but in some it does not, and people ultimately divorce. With a divorce comes asset division and in many cases support obligations. What happens though when there is an application to modify or terminate that obligation at retirement and the assets that were divided at the time of the divorce have grown considerably for the saver spouse and all but disappeared for the spendthrift spouse? One party can live comfortably off of their retirement income because they have saved their marital assets and grown them considerably but the other has no savings because they spent their share of the marital assets on either poor investments or a lavish lifestyle.
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1), applies to awards entered after the effective date of the statute (post 2014) and provides:
(1) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that alimony shall terminate upon the obligor spouse or partner attaining full retirement age, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the termination date shall not be vacated or annulled. The court may set a different alimony termination date for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The rebuttable presumption may be overcome if, upon consideration of the following factors and for good cause shown, the court determines that alimony should continue:
(a) The ages of the parties at the time of the application for retirement;
(b) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and their ages at the time of entry of the alimony award;
(c) The degree and duration of the economic dependency of the recipient upon the payor during the marriage or civil union;
(d) Whether the recipient has foregone or relinquished or otherwise sacrificed claims, rights or property in exchange for a more substantial or longer alimony award;
(e) The duration or amount of alimony already paid;
(f) The health of the parties at the time of the retirement application;
(g) Assets of the parties at the time of the retirement application;
(h) Whether the recipient has reached full retirement age as defined in this section;
(i) Sources of income, both earned and unearned, of the parties;
(j) The ability of the recipient to have saved adequately for retirement; and
(k) Any other factors that the court may deem relevant.
Subsection (j)(3) states:
When a retirement application is filed in cases in which there is an existing final alimony order or enforceable written agreement established prior to the effective date of this act, the obligor's reaching full retirement age as defined in this section shall be deemed a good faith retirement age. Upon application by the obligor to modify or terminate alimony, both the obligor's application to the court for modification or termination of alimony and the obligee's response to the application shall be accompanied by current Case Information Statements or other relevant documents as required by the Rules of Court, as well as the Case Information Statements or other documents from the date of entry of the original alimony award and from the date of any subsequent modification. In making its determination, the court shall consider the ability of the obligee to have saved adequately for retirement as well as the following factors in order to determine whether the obligor, by a preponderance of the evidence, has demonstrated that modification or termination of alimony is appropriate.
As the Court in Landers v. Landers noted: “[i]mportantly, subsection (j)(3) elevates the ability of the obligee to have saved adequately for retirement, listed only as a factor under N.J.S.A. 2A:34–23(j)(1)(j), setting it apart from other considerations and requiring its explicit analysis. N.J.S.A . 2A:34–23(j)(3). 444 N.J. Super. 315, 323 (App. Div. 2016).
I could not locate any cases where the obligee’s ability to save for retirement was utilized in the analysis as a reason to deny or grant terminate or modify their alimony, however, there is an interesting unpublished decision attached. In Hagelin v. Hagelin, 2007 NJ Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1983, Wife received $1,423,000 in equitable distribution and Husband received $2,846,000 at the
time of the Judgment of Divorce. Husband was to pay Wife open durational alimony at the rate of $35,000 per year, except if Wife moved from the apartment above the funeral home owned by Husband, the alimony would increase to $60,000 per year. The reason was because many of the expenses: rent, utilities, etc. were being provided for Wife by the business. The parties were divorced in December of 1996.
From April of 1998 through June of 2002, when the motion to modify and terminate support was filed, Husband received $5.488 million from the sale of his business. Only $135,000 remained in 2002. After deducting taxes, alimony, investment losses and medical insurance, the Court found that Husband spent $1,545,000 on “lifestyle” expenses—vacations, automobiles, horseback riding, and incurred $324,443 in credit card activity. The Court estimated that Husband spent approximately $362,500 a year (or $30,00 a month on lifestyle expenses). This spending was so out of line with the marital lifestyle. The Court undertook this analysis to compare Husband’s spending post-divorce to the marital lifestyle. As we all know, the marital standard of living “is an essential component in the changed-circumstances analysis when reviewing an application for modification of alimony.” Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 25 (2000). The testimony of a financial-planning expert can be and was used in the case to determine whether the dependent spouse is still dependent upon the level of alimony set forth in the PSA to maintain the lifestyle called for in the MSA.
After reviewing the payments Husband was receiving from the non-compete contract ($177,000 per year), the Court found that he was able to pay the $60,000 alimony. The Appellate Division held, in a footnote, that the Court could have also found that Husband had the means to obtain income from other sources but chose to expend other funds and assets in an extravagant way and in a manner that generated no cash flow. Citing Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 422 (1999). The Court found that Wife managed her assets well, even though they were less than Husband’s. The more common scenario is where the obligor has greater assets than the obligee at the time of retirement (perhaps because of greater wages and/or a greater knowledge of investment strategy) and the Court is tasked with considering whether (or to what extent) it will consider the obligee’s choice to spend those assets received at the time of the entry of the Judgment or whether they could have saved them and invested them in order to have generated income for themselves now at retirement.
The issue to consider when preparing an application for termination or modification based on retirement under the pre-amendment statute (j)(3) is the emphasis on a party’s ability to save for retirement and what did the oblige (and maybe the obligor as well) do with the assets distributed at the time of the entry of the Judgment of Divorce. Some considerations may include the RMDs from certain retirement accounts, at what age did one party being collecting SSA, 401k contributions made while the oblige was working (if they worked). All of these may factor into whether or not the application is successful. Hagelin is an interesting case because it tells us that the Court did consider how one party spent the funds rather than saving them post-retirement income generation.